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Abstract: This paper examines dynamic identity, as it pertains to the Internet of Things (IoT),
and explores the practical implementation of a mitigation technique for some of the key weaknesses
of a conventional dynamic identity model. This paper explores human-centric and machine-based
observer approaches for confirming device identity, permitting automated identity confirmation
for deployed systems. It also assesses the advantages of dynamic identity in the context of identity
revocation permitting secure change of ownership for IoT devices. The paper explores use-cases for
human and machine-based observation for authentication of device identity when devices join a
Command and Control(C2) network, and considers the relative merits for these two approaches for
different types of system.
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1. Introduction
One of the key aspects of any real-world deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is the
security of the system. In the context of Internet of Things (IoT), security requires that messages
from devices have not been modified on route, and that they originate from a valid sender, as well
as often requiring that the messages are protected from eavesdroppers. The Secure Remote Update
Protocol (SRUP) [1] proposes a mechanism to address these requirements. SRUP enables secure,
and authenticated Command and Control (C2) communication for IoT devices. The protocol is built on
top of Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and utilizes a signed, binary message pattern
which is used to send operational messages (such as data, commands, or instructions to receive
software or firmware updates) between a C2 server and a series of IoT devices.
In addition to these message types, the protocol also supports a number of management messages,
including facilitating the secure joining of devices to a C2 network.
In order to ensure the authenticity of both the message and the sender, all messages are
signed by the sender. Messages may also be optionally encrypted by using MQTT overTransport
Layer Security (TLS). In the current implementation of SRUP, both operations rely on the use
of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public/private key-pairs (although the protocol permits any
asymmetric cryptographic system to be utilized, providing all parties in the C2 network agree on
which is being used).
This paper builds upon a previous work [2] which described a scheme by which a human observer
could confirm that a specified physical device was in possession of the logical identity it claimed to hold,
and describes the implementation of a scheme to enable the automatic matching of a physical device,
to its logical identity, via a trusted third-party: an observer node.
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2. Background
2.1. Dynamic Device Identity
There are two approaches to defining the identity of a hardware device. The first of these is to
issue the device with a fixed identity at the time of manufacture. This may be carried out either by
permanently associating a key to the hardware by burning it into Read Only Memory (ROM) or storing
it within a cryptographic storage device [3], or by deriving the identity using physical characteristics
of the hardware—such as Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [4].
The alternative method, which alleviates the need to rely on pre-determined fixed identities, is to
use dynamically generated identities. This technique creates a unique identity at the time that a device
is registered with the system, and allows that identity to be revoked and subsequently a new identity
may be created.
Adopting this approach has a number of advantages. It eliminates the requirement to securely
generate and distribute the keys associated with a fixed identity conferred at the time of manufacture.
Given that it also enables the identity associated with a device to be revoked, and for a new identity
to be assigned, this approach makes it much easier to ascertain that any previous access to a device
has been revoked, since the identity to which any previous permissions applied no longer exists.
This concept is especially important for high-value Internet-connected devices, such as cars, which may
be expected to have more than one owner during their lifetime. When utilising a fixed identity it is
not possible for the new owner of a device to be certain that all previous owners have relinquished
all access to the device; but when dynamic identities are used, the new owner may simply generate a
new identity for the device and delete the old identity, guaranteeing that no other user has the security
credentials for the new identity.
Dynamic identity also has the advantage that a device may be joined to any compatible
system—with the minimum prior knowledge of that system. Providing the device knows the end-point
address for the system’s key registration service, all other data can be bootstrapped, and the C2 service
does not require any previous relationship with the device manufacturer or originator.
2.2. Dynamic Identity and SRUP
When initially registering with the system (or when replacing a previous identity with a newly
created one), devices are required to establish contact with a web application overSecure Hyper-Text
Transfer Protocol (HTTPS)—to request an identity and to perform key exchange with the system.
By using HTTPS, the device is able to positively determine the identity of the web service, and prevent
a man-in-the-middle attack versus the key exchange process. This may exploit public Certificate
Authorities (CAs) for Internet-based resources (where the CA certificate is already present within
the root of trust on the device); or by the a priori provision of a private CA certificate to the devices,
for systems designed to operate on private networks. Using HTTPS also ensures that the traffic
between the device and web application is encrypted against eavesdropping.
This process generates a SRUP key-pair to be used by devices and the C2 server when
communicating via SRUP messages. In all cases the sending device signs the message—enabling
the receiver to positively determine that the message in question has originated from a valid source,
and that it has not been tampered with (or otherwise modified) in transit. Additionally, for systems
electing to use MQTT over TLS for message security, the service also issues the device with an TLS
certificate and key, enabling the device to participate in encrypted communications with the MQTT
broker. This approach also permits the broker to restrict the device’s access to topics, other than
those associated with the device itself—and thus prevents a malicious device connecting in order to
eavesdrop on the message traffic at the broker.
Within the SRUP protocol, identity revocation can be conducted either from the device (for
example as a result of user interaction), or from the C2 server. Revocation from the device ensures
that the old identity no longer exists, regardless of whether it remains registered within the C2 system:
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this has the advantage that it does not require consent from the C2 system, and enables the device to join
a new (or rejoin the previous) C2 system under a new identity. Devices should send a deregister request
to inform the server that that identity is being revoked—but this is not mandatory. Revocation from
the C2 server will result in the device being sent a deregister command message. On receipt of this
the device should revert to an unregistered state—since it will no longer be able to communicate with
servers using the identity it currently holds. Within the protocol it is not possible for a third-party to
cause the revocation of an identity.
2.3. Dynamic Identity and C2 Systems
Once a device has an established identity, that device may elect to join a C2 network,
either autonomously or as a result of a user-interaction. In low-security scenarios a C2 server may be
configured to permit joining of any devices without further establishment of their credentials and as
such, a simple join operation may be conducted.
Since any device joining the system may have just generated (or regenerated) its identity it is
not possible for the C2 server (or a human operator of that C2 server) to ascertain the physical device
to which that identity pertains. For low security systems (those where there are no sensitivities to
the data and where the system itself is not controlling critical operations), this may be regarded as
acceptable. However, for systems where there is the risk of an attacker injecting false data into the
system, such an approach cannot be adopted.
The behaviour governing what types of join can be permitted (either globally, or on a device type
basis) is determined in software by the C2 system.
The risk from a simple join is that an attacker could stage an attack against the system by
intercepting the initial registration request from a device and then registering their own device and
joining this instead. Since in the context of a simple join there is no validation of the physical identity
of the device that has just requested to join, an attack may register their own device in place of the
real device.
3. Validating Physical Identity Using Third-Party Observation
The solution to the attack mechanism identified in Section 2.3 is to require that the logical device
joining proves its physical identity to the system at the time of the join operation.
The mechanism to enable this (described in previous work [2]) requires that the C2 server sends
the device a message encrypted using its SRUP public key—containing a randomly determined 128-bit
cryptographic nonce value. The device must then respond by showing the value back to the server—via
a channel external to the protocol itself. This technique guarantees that only the logical device involved
in the join request is in possession of the correct nonce value; and since the third-party is interacting
with the physical device in the real-world, if the physical device is able to provide this value to the
observer then the logical device must correspond to the physical device.
Whilst this approach is still theoretically susceptible to an attack scenario where an attacker is
able to cause the joining of a malicious device to a C2 network, such an approach requires the device
to be co-located with the deployed system. For critical systems, such as those posing a hazard to life
(or systems for which an elevated threat is suspected), there would still therefore be a requirement
to adopt traditional techniques of manual inspection to determine the authenticity of the physical
device, before the join process is initiated. The automated observation approach does however prevent
a remote adversary from being able to join the system: and as always in security, if the attacker has
physical access to facilities or other locations, there are a great many other (simpler) forms of attack
that they could exploit.
The third-party observer is required to be able to receive information from the device, via an
external channel to the SRUP protocol. Previous work identified mechanisms for displaying 128-bit
nonce values to enable easy comparison by a human observer—including pictographs, and word lists.
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Implementations of both of these techniques were examined as a part of this work, and examples of
each can be seen in Section 4).
Further work was conducted to examine a number of technologies to enable machine-based
observation: including machine-readable visual codes, and very short-range Radio Frequency
communications protocols.
4. Implementing Observation-Based Identity Confirmation, with a Human-Moderated Join
As described in more detail in [2], the concept of a human-moderated join is to require a human
user to positively match a unique value sent to the device—with the corresponding display of that
value by the C2 user-interface. This process is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. A flowchart illustrating the observed join process: showing the roles of each of the three
entities involved.
Two simple example devices were constructed to demonstrate human-in-the-loop observation,
based around the approaches described by [2]. Both devices are based around the Raspberry Pi
Single-Board Computer.
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The first (shown in Figure 2) consisted of a Raspberry Pi 3 fitted with a full-colour Liquid Crystal
Display (LCD) graphics display panel.
Figure 2. An example Internet of Things (IoT) device—built from a Raspberry Pi 3 fitted with a
full-colour liquid crystal display (LCD) graphics display panel.
This device was used in conjunction with an implementation of a four-colour pictogram.
A second device (shown in Figure 3) consisting of a smaller Raspberry Pi Zero W and a three-colour
Electronic Ink (eInk) display [5] was also built; this was used with a word-list observation.
Figure 3. An example IoT device—built from a Raspberry Zero W fitted with a three-colour eInk display.
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Both of these were demonstrated in combination with a simple web-based C2 server, which was
configured to show either a two- or four-colour pictogram or the word list. An example of this is
shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. An example web-based C2 interface for an IoT system, showing an example display depicting
a range of human-comparable display options.
5. Technologies for Automated Observation-Based Identity Confirmation
For scenarios with a large number of devices, or where devices are expected to be
deployed autonomously without a human presence, it may be necessary or desirable to adopt
machine-based observation.
For this to work, a trusted observer node must be present within the C2 network, and must have
already securely joined (for example using a human-moderated observation—as described in the
previous section). This observer will then utilize one or more techniques to observe the value presented
by the joining device, and to confirm that this matches the value that the C2 server had transmitted.
Unlike a scheme adopting a human observer, where the C2 system may be able to directly
present a representation of the value to the user for them to compare with the device, an automated
observer node must also be securely sent a copy of the code. Specifically, once the C2 server receives an
automated join request from a device, the server will respond by sending an OBSERVED_JOIN_RESPONSE
message to the device, as well as an OBSERVATION_REQUEST message to the observer. Both of these
messages contain a copy of the 128-bit nonce value to be used for the comparison, and each message is
encrypted using the recipient’s SRUP public-key, ensuring that only that recipient is able to decrypt
the data and read the value.
Once the observer and the device each have their own copy of the nonce, the device should
present the value to the observer for comparison and onwards signalling.
A flowchart illustrating the observed join process is shown in Figure 1.
In this work, two sets of technologies have been examined to provide this observation.
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5.1. Visual Observation Technologies
One set of technologies that can be adopted for the observation is machine-readable visual
codes—such as barcodes, QR or Data Matrix codes.
Conventional one-dimensional barcodes can store a maximum of around 100 characters (for
example Code 128 is defined in [6] and can store 103 data symbols). However, two-dimensional
barcodes such as the QR Code or Data Matrix (defined [7]) can store over 1000 symbols.
For SRUP observations, we need to encode a 128-bit value: here is a Universally Unique Identifier
(UUID) rendered as a string of 32 hexadecimal characters [8]. As such, any display hardware capable
of displaying either a one- or two-dimensional barcode could be adopted—along with any barcode
technology capable of displaying 32 hexadecimal characters (e.g., Code-128, Code-93 or Code-39).
The disadvantage of linear codes is that for a 32-character code, the resulting barcode is quite
long—exceeding the convenient aspect-ratio and dimensions of many displays without unduly
squeezing the vertical height—resulting in the mark/space size of the code being reduced.
Figure 5a–c show the same 32-character hexadecimal value, rendered in a number of one-dimensional
codes, and Figure 6a,b show the same data rendered as two-dimensional codes.
(a) Code-39
(b) Code-93
(c) Code-128
Figure 5. A 32-character hexadecimal value, rendered in a number of one-dimensional bar code types.
(a) Data Matrix Code (b) QR Code
Figure 6. The 32-character hexadecimal value, rendered as two-dimensional bar code types.
Experimentation using codes for the same UUID value—rendered on an LCD display, and read
using a smart-phone camera—showed that only Code-93 and Code-128 linear barcodes could be
reliably read (and that Code-93 was most often read). Code-39 format barcodes were not readable.
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Two-dimensional codes, on the other hand, are already more suitable to being rendered on a
display, due to their square shape, and both Data Matrix and QR codes could be easily read by the app,
with approximately the same accuracy.
The Data Matrix code has some potential advantages over the QR code, including the resulting
size of the code required for a given length of data being smaller, and improved detection and error
correction [9].
Further experimentation was conducted using a Raspberry Pi and camera, looking to
automatically locate and extract a 32-character hexadecimal value encoded as a two-dimensional
barcode. Unlike the previous example, here the code was not manually aligned with the reader: rather,
the software was required to identify where in the image streamed from the camera, the barcode was
located before it could be decoded.
In both cases the Pi (a Raspberry Pi 3B+), fitted with a Raspberry Pi Camera Module, was running
Python code to process the image. For the Data Matrix code, the pylibdmtx library [10] was used,
and the QR codes were read using the pyzbar library [11].
In both cases the code was tweaked to maximize performance. With the Data Matrix code, the best
performance was achieved when processing a 320 × 240 grayscale. PNG file (taken from an video
capture of the camera being shown the code): and it took an average of 12.7 s per image to detect
and extract the code (in contrast to less than a second when the DM code is manually cropped from
the image file). This is unacceptably slow for a system processing video frames, and is in contrast to
the pyzbar library, searching for QR codes—which was shown to manage to process several frames
per second.
Although additional image processing and manipulation techniques could be used (for example to
detect and crop the DM code in the image), for the purposes of demonstrating the machine observation
techniques QR codes were selected.
5.2. Radio Frequency Identification
In addition to a visual observation, a short-range RF link was also adopted to demonstrate a
different class of observation node. Although a number of technologies were initially considered
(including Bluetooth [12], and the IEEE 802.15.4 Zigbee standard [13]), the best guarantees as to
the physical location of the device in question were achieved when using ultra short-range RF
communications such as those used for Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID).
RFID technologies fall into two broad classes: low-frequency devices (operating at 125 kHz in
Europe), and high-frequency devices operating at 13.56 MHz [14].
Low frequency systems typically have an operating range of several inches, but have very
low data transfer capabilities and are only used with simple passive tags containing a static serial
number determined at the time of manufacture. Such devices are typically used for asset tracking.
High frequency systems may store up to 4 Kb of data [15], and may be writable as well as readable.
This class of tag is often produced in a credit-card sized form-factor, and is often used to provide security
access tokens, as well as cashless ticketing in public transportation systems.
Near-Field Communication (NFC) also operates on the 13.56 MHz frequency and supports active
communication between two devices, over a range of a few centimetres.
Despite (or perhaps because of) its ubiquity within the security (RFID) and banking sector (NFC
for contactless payments), the state of easily accessible and open-source software to support operations
more complex than reading or writing to simple tags is somewhat limited.
Most devices capable of reading NFC data (including most mobile phones) are able to read static
tags which have been formatted using the NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) [16] standard; but there
is somewhat limited support for the active data exchange provided by the Simple NDEF Exchange
Protocol (SNEP) [17,18].
A simple device was constructed to utilize Simple NDEF Exchange Protocol (SNEP),
utilizing open-source example C code and based on the PN532 NFC [19] chipset connected using the
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Inter-Integrated Circuit Protocol (I2C). This was interfaced to a Raspberry Pi as a USB serial device,
using an Arduino development board, based on the Atmel ATMega32U [20] microcontroller. This is
shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. An near-field communication (NFC) Observer device, consisting of a PN532 NFC module,
connected via Inter-Integrated Circuit Protocol (I2C) to a development board based on an Atmel
ATMega32U4 microcontroller, connected to a Raspberry Pi via Universal Serial Bus (USB).
6. Other Device Identity Validation Techniques
El-hajj et al. identify a taxonomy for IoT authentication schemes [21], identifying Token-based and
Procedurally based techniques for device authentication, in addition to identification based around the
static hardware-based approaches described in Section 2.1.
Token-based authentication schemes, such as OAuth2’s Device Authorization Grant [22],
are typically used to provide a secure mechanism for an individual user to validate their credentials
for a given service on a specific device, which is carried out using a third-party device, such as using a
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mobile-phone, to visit a Universal Resource Locator (URL) associated with the process. This approach
may be seen, for example, when a user logs into a video-sharing website on a smart-television,
which presents a QR code for the user to read with their phone, causing the phone’s browser to access
the page to complete the validation operation.
Although superficially similar, the Device Authorization Grant approach is very different to
the one outlined in Section 5.1. This approach utilizes the OAuth2 [23] token-based approach and
is designed to permit a user to associate a device with the identity that they have defined with an
external identity provider (for example, Google, Facebook, etc.). Although a bespoke authorization
service could be constructed within the specifications of the OAuth2 standard, the standard of this
falls somewhat outside of the typical OAuth2 use-case. Additionally, such an approach requires a
human-in-the-loop to conventionally log into the authorization service in question, and offers no fully
automatic mechanism to pair the physical and logical device identities.
Moreover, using an OAuth-based approach requires that the device (in its deployed state) is
able to make outbound HTTPS requests. In contrast, although SRUP does require the device to
utilize HTTPS as a part of the initial registration phase (which may be performed prior to operational
deployment), the remainder of the join operations take place wholly over the MQTT protocol—which
is much more suited to potentially constrained network conditions which may be expected in an
operational deployment of a IoT device.
Procedurally based approaches, such as Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [24],
are utilized for devices adopting static identity and provide security for the messages, but do not
themselves offer any guarantee that the physical device in question corresponds to the identity of the
logical device and rely on secure on-device storage of the certificate and key.
7. Implementing Observation-Based Identity Confirmation, with a Machine-Moderated Join
A series of devices was constructed, based on the Raspberry Pi platform and utilizing (an updated
version of) the pySRUP library (introduced in [25]). By using pySRUP, a SRUP IoT device can be
quickly written in Python, which can exploit all of the features of the SRUP protocol.
During this work, the pySRUP library was modified to fully support human and machine-based
observations. The web-based C2 interface was also modified to support observation.
7.1. Sequence Diagram
The full information exchange process that occurs during the machine-moderated observed join
process is illustrated as a sequence diagram in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. A sequence diagram showing the Machine-Moderated Join Process.
Future Internet 2020, 12, 138 12 of 15
7.2. Hardware
Two sets of devices were constructed around the Raspberry Pi hardware: one using the visual
recognition scheme and one to use NFC.
The visual device was identical to the one used for the human-readable pictograms, with a simple
observer constructed from a Raspberry Pi fitted with a camera module.
The NFC hardware consisted of two Raspberry Pi’s connected over USB to the PN532 modules
described previously. One was configured as an NFC observer and a second as a joining device.
In the case of both the visual and the NFC devices, the same pySRUP library code was utilized.
The only change required was that the device must specify the required operation in the call-back
function relating to the observation and presentation of the identity confirmation.
7.3. Operation
With the visual observation scheme, the target device is required to be within the field of view of
the observing camera. For the NFC-based observer, the device must be close enough to the observer
for the observer to be able to read the data.
In either case, the outcome of an observation attempt is one of three states: either the code was read
correctly (VALID), or an invalid code was read (INVALID), or no code could be read and the observation
operation timed-out (FAILED). For this example system, in the event that the observer signalled back
to the C2 server that it failed to read a value, the C2 server would simply reissue the observation
request to both the device and the observer. In a real-world system, the implementation should cap
the number of failed read requests by a given device to a (highly system- and implementation-specific)
reasonable number; but for testing purposes this was not capped in the demonstration.
Although a logical observer device is only able to read one type of device communications,
multiple logical observers may be combined into a single physical device.
8. Considerations for Real-World Use of Observed Join
8.1. Human versus Machine Observation
The question of which type of observer (human or machine)—and the larger question of whether
an observed join is required at all—is highly dependant on the specifics of the operation and
deployment of a given system.
A system utilizing wired sensors on a closed network (such as that found within a larger
operational platform—such as a vehicle or factory) may not require any identity validation when
joining (especially where physical access to an air-gapped network is controlled). A more typical
deployment in a domestic or commercial setting may utilize an open Internet connection to
facilitate the communications and as such could use a controlled join. For small-scale deployments,
a human-moderated join is an ideal mechanism, especially since this has no requirement for specialist
observation nodes. However, a smartphone application could be utilized as an observer (itself joining
via a human-moderated join)—and then subsequently using either the smartphone’s camera for visual
recognition, or potentially utilising the phone’s NFC capabilities to read values from devices without a
user-interface capable of displaying a visual code. Although this implementation has not been explored
in this work, the majority of modern smartphones support NFC for mobile payment, and Application
Program Interfaces (APIs) exist within major smartphone operating systems to access some or all of
the functionality of the NFC hardware within the phone.
Human moderated joins provide the highest guarantee of device identity, since the human
observer is explicitly able to ascertain that the device in question is the device that is being joined
(especially where the human installer has manually triggered the join operation themselves). It is
however the least scalable to very large deployments, or for scenarios where there is a large number of
join and leave operations expected to be conducted.
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For such large-scale operations, installed devices could join the C2 network, and have their
identity validated by a dedicated observation node. For example, within a factory setting an installer
could utilize a hand-held observer device using NFC to positively validate devices as they were
installed and joined into the system; or for a distributed sensor application, devices could be joined
(and validated) as they are deployed.
8.2. Benefits of Machine Observation
In a real-world deployment, different scenarios have different requirements for a
machine-moderated join. For devices where the deployment conditions prevent the observer node from
physically coming into close proximity to the device (such as an observer covering an area deployment,
it may be preferable to conduct an observation via a visual method, from a longer distance than may
be possible with other technologies. This may require the device to be large enough that both the
display, and the device to which it is mounted, are sufficiently visible to the remote observer.
Physical proximity can provide the best guarantee of the identity of the physical device,
for scenarios where this is achievable. For example, devices being deployed via a conveyor belt-fed
system, devices which are at a known and physically small location (such as passing through a door,
or gateway), or devices where a human can physically access and tap the device could all utilize this
type of approach.
Although designed around the IoT, and the idea of largely static devices, this approach (and the
SRUP protocol in general) will work well to support broader classes of smart devices, including smart
vehicles. However, for the purposes of identity validation, neither of the technologies employed in
this example implementation work especially well for scenarios where the device is in motion.
For example, in a scenario where the device would only be in the observers field-of-view for a
short period, careful and accurate timing would be required to ensure that the messages supporting
the request have been sent (and arrived) with sufficient time for the observer to be ready to view
the device. This may require, for example, that the device makes the request some period of time
before it expects to be observable (although the longer the time period between the message and the
observation, the greater the risk of another device being detected instead).
Similarly, both technologies require some finite time for the read operation to complete (a visual
observer would require that the entire display is visible in at least one frame of video; and an Radio
Frequency-based observer would require the device to be within the operating range of the reader
for at least the duration of the read operation). As such, operations to perform the join would be
required to take place during a time period when the device was static (such as at a control point or
barrier—prior to entering the smart system’s control).
8.3. Issues
In the present implementation of the system, a device is required to know the identity of the
observer that it wishes to use. In the examples shown above, this is hard-coded into the device’s source
code. There is currently no explicit mechanism within SRUP to specifically enable transmission of an
observer’s identity to a device. This is deliberate, since until or unless a device joins a C2 network,
it is not defined as to which servers may send SRUP messages to it. This is in contrast to the identity
of the default C2 server for a given device, which is explicitly sent to the device as a part of its initial
registration and key exchange process.
Since the device has the SRUP public key belonging to the default server (required so that it can
be used as a part of the joining process to validate messages from the server), the server could use the
extant DATA message within the SRUP protocol in order to send the identity of the observer that should
be used, after the server has refused the initial simple join. This could be trivially implemented by a
system using the pySRUP library by simply adding a data message handler callback function to the
device code and using the existing send_SRUP_Data method from the library, to send the observer ID
from the server.
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9. Conclusion
This paper has identified how both human and machine-based observation techniques can be
used to positively confirm the identity of a device joining a C2 network. We have shown that by using
these techniques we can utilize a dynamic identity scheme for IoT devices, enabling both guaranteed
revocation of prior access to a device by replacing the device identity with a new one, and simplifying
the process of device key distribution. We have shown that a suitable device (running software built
using the pySRUP library) can securely join a C2 network, positively establishing its identity to the
network, with no prior knowledge of the device required by the network, and with only a single URL
address for the key-management service required to be supplied to the device.
9.1. Future Work
A number of further experiments are planned to examine the utility of SRUP in conditions
representative of real-world deployments. In particular we plan to construct a further extension of
the protocol to support syndication of information between C2 networks exhibiting asymmetric trust
relationships. We also plan to examine performance and efficiency of the protocol in a variety of
network conditions, and to obtain performance metrics for comparison with other approaches.
9.2. Further Details
The software described here can be obtained as: doi:10.5281/zenodo.3898242. A video
demonstrating the machine-moderated join process in action can be seen at: https://youtu.be/
Vi135raj1LE.
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